A path traversal vulnerability exists in numerous routers manufactured by multiple vendors using Arcadyan based software. This vulnerability allows an unauthenticated user access to sensitive information and allows for the alteration of the router configuration.
Description
The vulnerability, identified as CVE-2021-20090, is a path traversal vulnerability. An unauthenticated attacker is able to leverage this vulnerability to access resources that would normally be protected. The researcher initially thought it was limited to one router manufacturer and published their findings, but then discovered that the issue existed in the Arcadyan based software that was being used in routers from multiple vendors.
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to access pages that would otherwise require authentication. An unauthenticated attacker could gain access to sensitive information, including valid request tokens, which could be used to make requests to alter router settings.
Solution
The CERT/CC recommends updating your router to the latest available firmware version. It is also recommended to disable the remote (WAN-side) administration services on any SoHo router and also disable the web interface on the WAN.
Multiple versions of Windows grant non-administrative users read access to files in the %windir%\system32\config directory. This can allow for local privilege escalation (LPE).
Description
With multiple versions of Windows, the BUILTIN\Users group is given RX permissions to files in the %windir%\system32\config directory.
If a VSS shadow copy of the system drive is available, a non-privileged user may leverage access to these files to achieve a number of impacts, including but not limited to:
Extract and leverage account password hashes.
Discover the original Windows installation password.
Obtain DPAPI computer keys, which can be used to decrypt all computer private keys.
Note that VSS shadow copies may not be available in some configurations, however simply having a system drive that is larger that 128GB in size and then performing a Windows Update or installing an MSI will ensure that a VSS shadow copy will be automatically created. To check if a system has VSS shadow copies available, run the following command from a privileged command prompt:
vssadmin list shadows
A system with VSS shadow copies will report details of at least one shadow copy that specifies Original Volume: (C:), such as the following:
vssadmin 1.1 - Volume Shadow Copy Service administrative command-line tool
(C) Copyright 2001-2013 Microsoft Corp.
Contents of shadow copy set ID: {d9e0503a-bafa-4255-bfc5-b781cb27737e}
Contained 1 shadow copies at creation time: 7/19/2021 10:29:49 PM
Shadow Copy ID: {b7f4115b-4242-4e13-84c0-869524965718}
Original Volume: (C:)\\?\Volume{4c1bc45e-359f-4517-88e4-e985330f72e9}\
Shadow Copy Volume: \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1
Originating Machine: DESKTOP-PAPIHMA
Service Machine: DESKTOP-PAPIHMA
Provider: 'Microsoft Software Shadow Copy provider 1.0'
Type: ClientAccessibleWriters
Attributes: Persistent, Client-accessible, No auto release, Differential, Auto recovered
A system without VSS shadow copies will produce output like the following:
vssadmin 1.1 - Volume Shadow Copy Service administrative command-line tool
(C) Copyright 2001-2013 Microsoft Corp.
No items found that satisfy the query.
To check if a system is vulnerable, the following command can be used from a non-privileged command prompt: icacls %windir%\system32\config\sam
A vulnerable system will report BUILTIN\Users:(I)(RX) in the output like this:
This vulnerability has been publicly referred to as both HiveNightmare and SeriousSAM, while Microsoft has assigned CVE-2021-36934 to the vulnerability.
Impact
By accessing files in the Windows %windir%\system32\config directory on a vulnerable system with at least one VSS shadow copy of the system drive, a local authenticated attacker may be able to achieve LPE, masquerade as other users, or achieve other security-related impacts.
Restrict access to %windir%\system32\config and remove VSS shadow copies
Vulnerable systems can enable ACL inheritance for files in the %windir%\system32\config directory by running the following command from an elevated prompt:
Once the ACLs have been corrected for these files, any VSS shadow copies of the system drive must be deleted to protect a system against exploitation. This can be accomplished with the following command:
vssadmin delete shadows /for=%systemdrive% /Quiet
Confirm that VSS shadow copies were deleted by running vssadmin list shadows again. Note that any capabilities relying on existing shadow copies, such as System Restore, will not function as expected. Newly-created shadow copies, which will contain the proper ACLs, will function as expected. Please see KB5005357 for more details.
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was publicly disclosed by Jonas Lyk, with additional details provided by Benjamin Delpy.
Microsoft Windows allows for non-admin users to be able to install printer drivers via Point and Print. Printers installed via this technique also install queue-specific files, which can be arbitrary libraries to be loaded by the privileged Windows Print Spooler process.
Description
Microsoft Windows allows for users who lack administrative privileges to still be able to install printer drivers, which execute with SYSTEM privileges via the Print Spooler service. This ability is achieved through a capability called Point and Print. Starting with the update for MS16-087, Microsoft requires that printers installable via Point are either signed by a WHQL release signature, or are signed by a certificate that is explicitly trusted by the target system, such as an installed test signing certificate. The intention for this change is to avoid installation of malicious printer drivers, which can allow for Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) to SYSTEM.
While Windows enforces that driver packages themselves are signed by a trusted source, Windows printer drivers can specify queue-specific files that are associated with the use of the device. For example, a shared printer can specify a CopyFiles directive for arbitrary ICM files. These files, which may be copied over alongside the digital-signature-enforced printer driver files are not covered by any signature requirement. Furthermore, these files can be used to overwrite any of the signature-verified files that were placed on a system during printer driver install. This can allow for LPE to SYSTEM on a vulnerable system.
By connecting to a malicious printer, an attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a vulnerable system.
Solution
The CERT/CC is currently unaware of a practical solution to this problem. Please consider the following workarounds:
Block outbound SMB traffic at your network boundary
Public exploits for this vulnerability utilize SMB for connectivity to a malicious shared printer. If outbound connections to SMB resources are blocked, then this vulnerability may be mitigated for malicious SMB printers that are hosted outside of your network. Note that Microsoft indicates that printers can be shared via the [MS-WPRN] Web Point-and-Print Protocol, which may allow installation of arbitrary printer drivers without relying on SMB traffic. Also, an attacker local to your network would be able to share a printer via SMB, which would be unaffected by any outbound SMB traffic rules.
Configure PackagePointAndPrintServerList
Microsoft Windows has a Group Policy called "Package Point and Print - Approved servers", which is reflected in the HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PackagePointAndPrint\PackagePointAndPrintServerList and HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PackagePointAndPrint\ListofServers registry values. This policy can restrict which servers can be used by non-administrative users to install printers via Point and Print. Configure this policy to prevent installation of printers from arbitrary servers.
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was publicly disclosed by Benjamin Delpy.
The Microsoft Windows Print Spooler service fails to restrict access to functionality that allows users to add printers and related drivers, which can allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a vulnerable system.
Description
The RpcAddPrinterDriverEx() function is used to install a printer driver on a system. One of the parameters to this function is the DRIVER_CONTAINER object, which contains information about which driver is to be used by the added printer. The other argument, dwFileCopyFlags, specifies how replacement printer driver files are to be copied. An attacker can take advantage of the fact that any authenticated user can call RpcAddPrinterDriverEx() and specify a driver file that lives on a remote server. This results in the Print Spooler service spoolsv.exe executing code in an arbitrary DLL file with SYSTEM privileges.
While Microsoft has released an update for CVE-2021-1675, it is important to realize that this update does NOT protect against public exploits that may refer to PrintNightmare or CVE-2021-1675.
On July 1, Microsoft released CVE-2021-34527. This bulletin states that CVE-2021-34527 is similar but distinct from the vulnerability that is assigned CVE-2021-1675, which addresses a different vulnerability in RpcAddPrinterDriverEx(). The attack vector is different as well. CVE-2021-1675 was addressed by the June 2021 security update.
Impact
By sending a request to add a printer, e.g. by using RpcAddPrinterDriverEx() over SMB or RpcAsyncAddPrinterDriver() over RPC, a remote, authenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a vulnerable system. A local unprivileged user may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges as well. We have created a flowchart to indicate exploitability of PrintNightmare across various platform configurations:
Solution
Apply an update
Microsoft has addressed this issue in the updates for CVE-2021-34527. Note that the Microsoft update for CVE-2021-34527 does not effectively prevent exploitation of systems where the Point and PrintNoWarningNoElevationOnInstall is set to a non-0 value. Microsoft indicates that systems that have NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall is set to a non-0 value are vulnerable by design. For systems that do not have the CVE-2021-34527 installed, or have Point and Print configured insecurely, please consider the following workarounds:
Microsoft Option 1 - Stop and disable the Print Spooler service
This vulnerability can be mitigated by stopping and disabling the Print Spooler service in Windows.
If disabling the Print Spooler service is appropriate for your enterprise, use the following PowerShell commands:
Stop-Service -Name Spooler -Force
Set-Service -Name Spooler -StartupType Disabled
Impact of workaround Disabling the Print Spooler service disables the ability to print both locally and remotely.
Microsoft Option 2 - Disable inbound remote printing through Group Policy
Disable the “Allow Print Spooler to accept client connections:” policy to block remote attacks.
Impact of workaround This policy will block the remote attack vector by preventing inbound remote printing operations. The system will no longer function as a print server, but local printing to a directly attached device will still be possible.
Note: The Print Spooler service must be restarted for this workaround to be activated.
Block RPC and SMB ports at the firewall
Limited testing has shown that blocking both the RPC Endpoint Mapper (135/tcp) and SMB (139/tcp and 445/tcp) at the firewall level can prevent remote exploitation of this vulnerability. Note that blocking these ports on a Windows system may prevent expected capabilities from functioning properly, especially on a system that functions as a server.
Enable security prompts for Point and Print
Ensure that the Windows Point and Print Restrictions are set to Show warning and elevation prompt for both installing and updating drivers in the Windows Group Policy. Specifically the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PointAndPrint\ key should have NoWarningNoElevationOnInstall and UpdatePromptSettings entries that are both set to 0.
Restrict printer driver installation ability to administrators
After the Microsoft update for CVE-2021-34527 is installed, a registry value called RestrictDriverInstallationToAdministrators in the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows NT\Printers\PointAndPrint\ key is checked, which is intended to restrict printer driver installation to only administrator users. Please see KB5005010 for more details.
Acknowledgements
This issue was publicly disclosed by Zhiniang Peng and Xuefeng Li.
Checkbox Survey prior to version 7.0 insecurely deserializes ASP.NET View State data, which can allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable server.
Description
CVE-2021-27852 Checkbox Survey insecurely deserializes ASP.NET View State data.
Checkbox Survey is an ASP.NET application that can add survey functionality to a website. Prior to version 7.0, Checkbox Survey implements its own View State functionality by accepting a _VSTATE argument, which it then deserializes using LosFormatter. Because this data is manually handled by the Checkbox Survey code, the ASP.NET ViewState Message Authentication Code (MAC) setting on the server is ignored. Without MAC, an attacker can create arbitrary data that will be deserialized, resulting in arbitrary code execution.
This vulnerability is reportedly being exploited in the wild.
Impact
By making a specially-crafted request to a server that uses Checkbox Survey 6.x or earlier, a remote, unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the web server.
Solution
Apply an update
Starting with Checkbox Survey 7.0, View State data is not used. Therefore, Checkbox Survey versions 7.0 and later do not contain this vulnerability.
Remove Checkbox Survey versions older than 7
Checkbox is no longer developing Checkbox Survey version 6, so this version is no longer safe to use. If you are unable to update to an unaffected version of Checkbox Survey, this software should be removed from any systems that have it installed.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the reporter who wishes to remain anonymous.
Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) gateway contains a buffer overflow vulnerability in Samba-related code that may allow an authenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code.
Description
CVE-2021-22908
PCS includes the ability to connect to Windows file shares (SMB). This capability is provided by a number of CGI scripts, which in turn use libraries and helper applications based on Samba 4.5.10. When specifying a long server name for some SMB operations, the smbclt application may crash due to either a stack buffer overflow or a heap buffer overflow, depending on how long of a server name is specified. We have confirmed that PCS 9.1R11.4 systems are vulnerable, targeting a CGI endpoint of: /dana/fb/smb/wnf.cgi. Other CGI endpoints may also trigger the vulnerable code.
Specifying a long server name to this endpoint may result in a PCS events log entry that may look like the following:
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may not produce such a log entry if the program is cleanly exited during exploitation, or if the log files are sanitized after successful exploitation.
In order to be vulnerable, a PCS server must have a Windows File Access policy that allows\\* or it must have some other policy set that would allow an attacker to connect to an arbitrary server. In the administrative page for the PCS, see Users -> Resource Policies -> Windows File Access Policies to view your current SMB policy. Any PCS device that started as version 9.1R2 or earlier will have a default policy that allows connecting to arbitrary SMB hosts. Starting with 9.1R3, this policy was changed from a default allow to a default deny.
Note that the vendor implies that the Files, Window[sic] access feature can be disabled for user roles in order to protect against this vulnerability. This is NOT the case. The vulnerable CGI endpoints are still reachable in ways that will trigger the smbclt application to crash, regardless of whether the Files, Windows user role is enabled or not. These steps are only included in the advisory to limit excessive errors showing up in PCS logs after the XML workaround has been installed.
In our testing, an attacker would need either valid PCS user credentials, or a DSID value from an authenticated user to successfully reach the vulnerable code on a PCS server that has an open Windows File Access policy. We have created a PoC utility to test for PCS systems vulnerable to CVE-2021-22908 as well as which mitigations may be applied.
Impact
By performing certain SMB operations with a specially-crafted server name, an authenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with root privileges on a vulnerable PCS server.
Solution
Apply an update
This issue is addressed in PCS 9.1R11.5. Please see advisory SA44800 for more details.
Apply an XML workaround
Pulse Secure has published advisory SA44800 that mentions a Workaround-2105.xml file that contains a mitigation to protect against this vulnerability. Importing this XML workaround will activate the protections immediately and does not require any downtime for the VPN system. This workaround will block requests that match the following URI patterns:
^/+dana/+fb/+smb
^/+dana-cached/+fb/+smb
Workaround-2105.xml will automatically deactivate the mitigations applied by Workaround-2104.xml when it is installed. As such, it is imperative that a PCS system is running 9.1R11.4 before applying the Workaround-2105.xml mitigation, which will ensure that the vulnerabilities outlined in SA44784 are not reintroduced as the result of applying this workaround.
Note that installing this workaround will block the ability to use the following feature:
Windows File Share Browser
Set a Windows File Access Policy
This vulnerability relies on the ability to connect to an arbitrary SMB server name to trigger the vulnerability. A PCS system that started as version 9.1R3 or later will have a default Initial File Browsing Policy of Deny for \\* SMB connections. If you have a PCS system that started as 9.1R2 or earlier, it will retain the default Initial File Browsing Policy of Allow for \\* SMB connections, which will expose this vulnerability. In the administrative page for the PCS, see Users -> Resource Policies -> Windows File Access Policies to view your current SMB policy.
If your PCS has a policy that explicitly allows \\* or otherwise may allow users to initiate connections to arbitrary SMB server names, you should configure the PCS to Deny connections to such resources to minimize your PCS attack surface.
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was reported by Will Dormann of the CERT/CC.
Devices supporting the Bluetooth Core and Mesh Specifications are vulnerable to impersonation attacks and AuthValue disclosure that could allow an attacker to impersonate a legitimate device during pairing.
Description
The Bluetooth Core Specification and Mesh Profile Specification are two specifications used to define the technical and policy requirements for devices that want to operate over Bluetooth connections. Researchers at the Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (ANSSI) have identified a number of vulnerabilities in each specification that allow impersonation attacks and AuthValue disclosures.
Devices supporting the Bluetooth Core Specification are affected by the following vulnerabilities:
Impersonation in the Passkey Entry Protocol
The Passkey Entry protocol used in Secure Simple Pairing (SSP), Secure Connections (SC), and LE Secure Connections (LESC) of the Bluetooth Core Specification is vulnerable to an impersonation attack that enables an active attacker to impersonate the initiating device without any previous knowledge (CVE-2020-26558). An attacker acting as a man-in-the-middle (MITM) in the Passkey authentication procedure could use a crafted series of responses to determine each bit of the randomly generated Passkey selected by the pairing initiator in each round of the pairing procedure, and once identified, the attacker can use these Passkey bits during the same pairing session to successfully complete the authenticated pairing procedure with the responder. Devices supporting BR/EDR Secure Simple Pairing in Bluetooth Core Specifications 2.1 through 5.2, BR/EDR Secure Connections Pairing in Bluetooth Core Specifications 4.1 through 5.2 and LE Secure Connections Pairing in Bluetooth Core Specifications 4.2 through 5.2 are affected by this vulnerability.
Impersonation in the Pin Pairing Protocol
The Bluetooth BR/EDR PIN Pairing procedure is vulnerable to an impersonation attack (CVE-2020-26555). An attacker could connect to a victim device by spoofing the Bluetooth Device Address (BD_ADDR) of the device, reflect the the encrypted nonce, and complete BR/EDR pin-code pairing with them without knowledge of the pin code. A successful attack requires the attacking device to be within wireless range of a vulnerable device supporting BR/EDR Legacy Pairing that is Connectable and Bondable. Devices supporting the Bluetooth Core Specification versions 1.0B through 5.2 are affected by this vulnerability.
Devices supporting Bluetooth Mesh Profile Specification, versions 1.0 and 1.0.1, are affected by the following vulnerabilities:
Impersonation in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning
The Mesh Provisioning procedure could allow an attacker without knowledge of the AuthValue, spoofing a device being provisioned, to use crafted responses to appear to possess the AuthValue and to be issued a valid NetKey and potentially an AppKey (CVE-2020-26560). For this attack to be successful, an attacking device needs to be within wireless range of a Mesh Provisioner and either spoof the identity of a device being provisioned over the air or be directly provisioned onto a subnet controlled by the provisioner.
Predictable AuthValue in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning Leads to MITM
The Mesh Provisioning procedure could allow an attacker observing or taking part in the provisioning to brute force the AuthValue if it has a fixed value, or is selected predictably or with low entropy (CVE-2020-26557). Identifying the AuthValue generally requires a brute-force search against the provisioning random and provisioning confirmation produced by the Provisioner. This brute-force search, for a randomly selected AuthValue, must complete before the provisioning procedure times out, which can require significant resources. If the AuthValue is not selected randomly with each new provisioning attempt, then the brute-force search can occur offline and if successful, would permit an attacker to identify the AuthValue and authenticate to both the Provisioner and provisioned devices, permitting a MITM attack on a future provisioning attempts with the same AuthValue.
Malleable Commitment
The authentication protocol is vulnerable if the AuthValue can be identified during the provisioning procedure, even if the AuthValue is selected randomly (CVE-2020-26556). If an attacker can identify the AuthValue used before the provisioning procedure times out, it is possible to complete the provisioning operation and obtain a NetKey. Similar to CVE-2020-26557, identifying the AuthValue generally requires a brute-force search against the provisioning random and provisioning confirmation produced by the Provisioner. This brute-force search for a randomly selected AuthValue, which can require significant resources, must complete before the provisioning procedure times out.
AuthValue Leak
The Mesh Provisioning procedure could allow an attacker that was provisioned without access to the AuthValue to identify the AuthValue directly without brute-forcing its value (CVE-2020-26559). Even when a randomly generated AuthValue with a full 128-bits of entropy is used, an attacker acquiring the Provisioner’s public key, provisioning confirmation value, and provisioning random value, and providing its public key for use in the provisioning procedure, will be able to compute the AuthValue directly.
Impact
Impersonation in the Passkey Entry Protocol
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to authenticate to the response victim device and act as a legitimate encrypted device. The attacker cannot pair with the initiating device using this method of attack, which prevents a fully transparent man-in-the-middle attack between the initiator and responder. For this attack to be successful, an attacking device needs to be within wireless range of two vulnerable Bluetooth devices that are initiating pairing or bonding for which a BR/EDR IO Capabilities exchange or LE IO Capability in the pairing request and response results in the selection of the Passkey pairing procedure.
Impersonation in the Pin Pairing Protocol
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to complete pairing with a known link key, encrypt communications with the vulnerable device, and access any profiles permitted by a paired or bonded remote device supporting Legacy Pairing.
Impersonation in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to successfully authenticate without the AuthValue. Once authenticated, the attacker could perform any operation permitted to a node provisioned on the subnet until it is either denied access or a new subnet is formed without the attacking node present.
Predictable AuthValue in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning Leads to MITM
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to successfully brute force the AuthValue and authenticate to both the Provisioner and provisioned devices, permitting a MITM attack on a future provisioning attempt with the same AuthValue.
Malleable Commitment
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to obtain a NetKey, which could be used to decrypt and authenticate up to the network layer, allowing the relay of messages, but no application data decryption.
AuthValue Leak
This vulnerability could allow an attacker to compute the AuthValue and authenticate to the Provisioner and provisioned devices.
Solution
Bluetooth users should ensure that they have installed the latest recommended updates from device and operating system manufacturers.
In addition to the two vulnerabilities affecting the Bluetooth Core Specification, the researchers also identified a potential security vulnerability related to LE Legacy Pairing authentication in Bluetooth Core Specification versions 4.0 through 5.2. The researchers claim that an attacker can reflect the confirmation and random numbers of a peer device in LE legacy pairing to successfully complete legacy authentication phase 2 without knowledge of the temporary key (TK). Because the attacker does not acquire a TK, or valid short-term key (STK) during this attack, completing authentication phase 2 is not sufficient for an encrypted link to be established. While the Bluetooth SIG does not consider this to be a method which can provide unauthorized access to a device, they still recommend that LE implementations requiring pairing and encryption use LE Secure Connections. The Bluetooth SIG also recommends that, where possible, implementations enable and enforce Secure Connections Only Mode, ensuring that LE legacy pairing cannot be used.
The Bluetooth SIG additionally makes the following recommendations for each vulnerability:
Impersonation in the Passkey Entry Protocol
For the attack to succeed the pairing device needs to accept the same public key that it provided to the remote peer as the remote peer’s public key. The Bluetooth SIG recommends that potentially vulnerable implementations restrict the public keys accepted from a remote peer device to disallow a remote peer to present the same public key chosen by the local device, and the pairing procedure should be terminated with a failure status if this occurs.
Impersonation in the Pin Pairing Protocol
The Bluetooth SIG recommends that potentially vulnerable devices not initiate or accept connections from remote devices claiming the same BD_ADDR as the local device. They also continue to recommend that devices use Secure Simple Pairing or BR/EDR Secure Connections to avoid known vulnerabilities with legacy BR/EDR pairing.
Impersonation in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning
The Bluetooth SIG recommends that potentially vulnerable mesh provisioners restrict the authentication procedure and not accept provisioning both random and confirmation numbers from a remote peer that are the same as those selected by the local device.
Predictable AuthValue in Bluetooth Mesh Provisioning Leads to MITM
The Bluetooth SIG recommends that mesh implementations enforce a randomly selected AuthValue using all of the available bits, where permitted by the implementation. A large entropy helps ensure that a brute-force of the AuthValue, even a static AuthValue, cannot normally be completed in a reasonable time.
Malleable Commitment
The statement from the Bluetooth SIG notes: "AuthValues selected using a cryptographically secure random or pseudorandom number generator and having the maximum permitted entropy (128-bits) will be most difficult to brute-force. AuthValues with reduced entropy or generated in a predictable manner will not grant the same level of protection against this vulnerability. Selecting a new AuthValue with each provisioning attempt can also make it more difficult to launch a brute-force attack by requiring the attacker to restart the search with each provisioning attempt."
AuthValue Leak
The Bluetooth SIG recommends that potentially vulnerable mesh provisioners use an out-of-band mechanism to exchange the public keys.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to researchers at the Agence nationale de la sécurité des systèmes d'information (ANSSI) for reporting these vulnerabilities.
MySQL for Windows contains a privilege escalation vulnerability due to the use of an OPENSSLDIR variable that specifies a location where an unprivileged Windows user can create files.
Description
CVE-2021-2307
MySQL includes an OpenSSL component that specifies an OPENSSLDIR variable as a subdirectory of /build_area/. On the Windows platform, this path is interpreted as C:\build_area. MySQL contains a privileged service that uses this OpenSSL component. Because unprivileged Windows users can create subdirectories off of the system root, a user can create the appropriate path to a specially-crafted openssl.cnf file to achieve arbitrary code execution with SYSTEM privileges.
Impact
By placing a specially-crafted openssl.cnf in a C:\build_area subdirectory, an unprivileged user may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a Windows system with the vulnerable MySQL software installed.
Solution
Apply an update
This vulnerability is addressed in the MySQL Windows installer version 8.0.24 and 5.7.34.
Create a C:\build_area directory
In cases where an update cannot be installed, this vulnerability can be mitigated by creating a C:\build_area directory and restricting ACLs to prevent unprivileged users from being able to write to this location.
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was reported by Will Dormann of the CERT/CC.
Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) gateway contains a use-after-free vulnerability that can allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code.
Description
CVE-2021-22893
A use-after-free vulnerability that can be reached via a license server handling endpoint may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code on a vulnerable Pulse Connect Secure gateway system.
Every system that is running PCS 9.0R3 or higher or 9.1R1 through 9.2R11.3 is affected. Having the license server configuration enabled is NOT a prerequisite to being vulnerable. The vulnerable endpoints are present regardless of whether the system is an actual license server or not.
By making a crafted request to a vulnerable Pulse Connect Secure system, an unauthenticated remote attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code on the gateway with root privileges.
Solution
Apply an update
This vulnerability and others are addressed in Pulse Connect Secure 9.1R11.4.
Apply a workaround
If you are not using the features that the following workaround disables, we recommend applying the XML workaround even on systems that have been upgraded to 9.1R11.4 to reduce attack surface. Pulse Secure has published a Workaround-2104.xml file that contains mitigations to protect against this and other vulnerabilities. Importing this XML workaround will activate the protections immediately and does not require any downtime for the VPN system. This workaround will block requests that match the following URI patterns:
Note that installing this workaround will block the ability to use the following features:
Windows File Share Browser
Pulse Secure Collaboration
License Server
Instead of using the workaround to protect a PCS that is being used as a license server, we recommend updating such systems to PCS 9.1R11.4. If this is not possible, restrict which IP addresses are allowed to communicate with the system.
Run the PCS Integrity Assurance utility
A PCS administrator should run the PCS Integrity Assurance utility to help determine if a system has evidence that it has been compromised. Please be aware of two limitations of this tool:
Upon completion of the Integrity Assurance tool, the PCS device will automatically reboot.
Because running the Integrity Assurance tool relies on the use of the administrative web interface of the PCS device itself, it is reasonable to assume that it may be possible for a compromised device to display misleading results.
Enable Unauthenticated Request logging
By default, PCS devices do not log unauthenticated web requests. Additionally, the administrative interface for a PCS device will warn that: Selecting this can quickly fill up User access log space in case of attack.
Because this vulnerability is exploitable via an unauthenticated request to the PCS, evidence of exploitation may only be present if the "Unauthenticated Requests" logging option is enabled. Enable this feature in the PCS administrative web interface by visiting:
System -> Log/Monitoring -> User Access -> Settings
and enabling the "Unauthenticated Requests" option.
Enable remote logging
Attackers who have compromised a PCS device may delete on-device logs in the process. For this reason, configure a remote Syslog server to ensure that PCS log entries are not modified or deleted.
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was publicly reported by Pulse Secure with additional details and context published by Fireye.
This document was written by Chuck Yarbrough and Will Dormann.
Atlassian Bitbucket on Windows fails to properly set ACLs, which can allow an unprivileged Windows user to run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.
Description
The Atlassian Bitbucket Windows installer fails to set a secure access-control list (ACL) on the default installation directory, such as C:\Atlassian\Bitbucket\. By default, unprivileged users can create files in this directory structure, which creates a privilege-escalation vulnerability.
Impact
By placing a specially-crafted DLL file in the Bitbucket installation directory, an unprivileged user may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a Windows system with the vulnerable Bitbucket software installed. See DLL Search Order Hijacking for more details.
Solution
Apply an update
This issue has been addressed in the Bitbucket Windows installer for versions 7.10.1, 7.6.4, and 6.10.9. Please see https://jira.atlassian.com/browse/BSERV-12753 for more details.
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was reported by Will Dormann of the CERT/CC.
Siemens Totally Integrated Administrator (TIA) fails to properly set the module search path to be used by a privileged Node.js component, which can allow an unprivileged Windows user to run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges. The PCS neo administration console is reported to be affected as well.
Description
Siemens TIA runs a privileged Node.js component. The Node.js server fails to properly set the module search path. Because of this, Node.js will look for modules in the C:\node_modules\ directory when the server is started. Because unprivileged Windows users can create subdirectories off of the system root, a user can create this directory and place a specially-crafted .js file in it to achieve arbitrary code execution with SYSTEM privileges when the server starts.
Impact
By placing a specially-crafted JS file in the C:\node_modules\ directory, an unprivileged user may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a Windows system with the vulnerable Siemens TIA or PCS neo administration console software installed.
A heap-based overflow has been discovered in the set_cmd() function in sudo, which may allow a local attacker to execute commands with elevated administrator privileges.
Sudo (su "do") allows a system administrator to delegate authority to give certain users (or groups of users) the ability to run some (or all) commands as root or another user while providing an audit trail of the commands and their arguments.
It is possible for a local Non-administrative user to exploit this vulnerability to elevate their privileges so that they can execute commands with administrator privileges. The team at Qualys assigned this vulnerability CVE-2021-3156 and found multiple *nix operating systems were vulnerable, including Fedora, Debian, and Ubuntu. A blog update from February 3, 2021, reports that macOS, AIX, and Solaris may be vulnerable, but Qualys had not yet confirmed this.
There is additional reporting that other operating systems are affected, including Apple’s Big Sur.
Impact
If an attacker has local access to an affected machine then it is possible for them to execute commands with administrator privileges.
Solution
Apply an Update
Update sudo to the latest version to address this vulnerability when operationally feasible. This issue is resolved in sudo version 1.9.5p2. Please install this version, or a version from your distribution that has the fix applied to it
Acknowledgements
This vulnerability was researched and reported by the Qualys Research Team.
Adobe ColdFusion fails to properly set ACLs, which can allow an unprivileged Windows user to be able to run arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges.
Description
The Adobe ColdFusion installer fails to set a secure access-control list (ACL) on the default installation directory, such as C:\ColdFusion2021\. By default, unprivileged users can create files in this directory structure, which creates a privilege-escalation vulnerability.
Impact
By placing a specially-crafted DLL file in the ColdFusion installation directory, an unprivileged user may be able to execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges on a Windows system with the vulnerable ColdFusion software installed. See DLL Search Order Hijacking for more details.
Solution
Use the Server Auto-Lockdown Installer
By default, ColdFusion does not configure itself securely. In order to secure ColdFusion with respect to service privileges, ACLs, and other attributes, the ColdFusion Server Auto-Lockdown installer must be installed in addition to installing ColdFusion itself.
Dnsmasq is vulnerable to a set of memory corruption issues handling DNSSEC data and a second set of issues validating DNS responses. These vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to corrupt memory on a vulnerable system and perform cache poisoning attacks against a vulnerable environment.
These vulnerabilities are also tracked as ICS-VU-668462 and referred to as DNSpooq.
Description
Dnsmasq is widely used open-source software that provides DNS forwarding and caching (and also a DHCP server). Dnsmasq is common in Internet-of-Things (IoT) and other embedded devices.
JSOF reported multiple memory corruption vulnerabilities in dnsmasq due to boundary checking errors in DNSSEC handling code.
CVE-2020-25681: A heap-based buffer overflow in dnsmasq in the way it sorts RRSets before validating them with DNSSEC data in an unsolicited DNS response
CVE-2020-25682: A buffer overflow vulnerability in the way dnsmasq extract names from DNS packets before validating them with DNSSEC data
CVE-2020-25683: A heap-based buffer overflow in get_rdata subroutine of dnsmasq, when DNSSEC is enabled and before it validates the received DNS entries
CVE-2020-25687: A heap-based buffer overflow in sort_rrset subroutine of dnsmasq, when DNSSEC is enabled and before it validates the received DNS entries
JSOF also reported vulnerabilities in DNS response validation that can result in DNS cache poisoning.
CVE-2020-25684: Dnsmasq does not validate the combination of address/port and the query-id fields of DNS request when accepting DNS responses
CVE-2020-25685: Dnsmasq uses a weak hashing algorithm (CRC32) when compiled without DNSSEC to validate DNS responses
CVE-2020-25686: Dnsmasq does not check for an existing pending request for the same name and forwards a new request thus allowing an attacker to perform a "Birthday Attack" scenario to forge replies and potentially poison the DNS cache
Note: These cache poisoning scenarios and defenses are discussed in IETF RFC5452.
Impact
The memory corruption vulnerabilities can be triggered by a remote attacker using crafted DNS responses that can lead to denial of service, information exposure, and potentially remote code execution. The DNS response validation vulnerabilities allow an attacker to use unsolicited DNS responses to poison the DNS cache and redirect users to arbitrary sites.
Solution
Apply updates
These vulnerabilities are addressed in dnsmasq 2.83. Users of IoT and embedded devices that use dnsmasq should contact their vendors.
Follow security best-practices
Consider the following security best-practices to protect DNS infrastructure:
Protect your DNS clients using stateful-inspection firewall that provide DNS security (e.g.,
stateful firewalls and NAT devices can block unsolicited DNS responses, DNS application layer inspection can prevent forwarding of anomalous DNS packets).
Provide secure DNS recursion service with features such as DNSSEC validation and the interim 0x20-bit encoding as part of enterprise DNS services where applicable.
Prevent exposure of IoT devices and lightweight devices directly over the Internet to minimize abuse of DNS.
Implement a Secure By Default configuration suitable for your operating environment (e.g., disable caching on embedded IoT devices when an upstream caching resolver is available).
Acknowledgements
Moshe Kol and Shlomi Oberman of JSOF researched and reported these vulnerabilities. Simon Kelley (author of dnsmasq) worked closely with collaborative vendors (Cisco, Google, Pi-Hole, Redhat) to develop patches to address these security vulnerabilities. GitHub also supported these collaboration efforts providing support to use their GitHub Security Advisory platform for collaboration.
The SolarWinds Orion API is vulnerable to authentication bypass that could allow a remote attacker to execute API commands.
Description
The SolarWinds Orion Platform is a suite of infrastructure and system monitoring and management products. The SolarWinds Orion API is embedded into the Orion Core and is used to interface with all SolarWinds Orion Platform products. API authentication can be bypassed by including specific parameters in the Request.PathInfo portion of a URI request, which could allow an attacker to execute unauthenticated API commands. In particular, if an attacker appends a PathInfo parameter of WebResource.axd, ScriptResource.axd, i18n.ashx, or Skipi18n to a request to a SolarWinds Orion server, SolarWinds may set the SkipAuthorization flag, which may allow the API request to be processed without requiring authentication.
This vulnerability, also known as CVE-2020-10148, is the vulnerability that SolarWinds has indicated to have been used to install the malware known as SUPERNOVA.
We have created a python3 script to check for vulnerable SolarWinds Orion servers: swcheck.py
Impact
This vulnerability could allow a remote attacker to bypass authentication and execute API commands which may result in a compromise of the SolarWinds instance.
Solution
Apply an Update
Users should update to the relevant versions of the SolarWinds Orion Platform:
2019.4 HF 6 (released December 14, 2020)
2020.2.1 HF 2 (released December 15, 2020)
2019.2 SUPERNOVA Patch (released December 23, 2020)
2018.4 SUPERNOVA Patch (released December 23, 2020)
2018.2 SUPERNOVA Patch (released December 23, 2020)
Apple on Monday released a major security update with fixes for a security defect the company says “may have been actively exploited” to plant malware on macOS and iOS devices.
No More Ransom is celebrating its 5th anniversary and the project says it has helped more than 6 million ransomware victims recover their files and prevented cybercriminals from earning roughly $1 billion.
Allegations that governments used phone malware supplied by an Israeli firm to spy on journalists, activists and heads of state have "exposed a global human rights crisis," Amnesty International said, asking for a moratorium on the sale and use of surveillance technology.
It was the start of a steamy Friday two Augusts ago when Jason Whisler settled in for a working breakfast at the Coffee Ranch restaurant in the Texas Panhandle city of Borger. The most pressing agenda item for city officials that morning: planning for a country music concert and anniversary event.
As attackers become more sophisticated, so do their attacks. This in turn exposes threat vectors that once were thought to be well protected, or at least not interesting enough to attack. Nowhere is this truer than in industrial control systems (ICS) environments.
GitLab last week announced the release of a new open source tool designed to help software developers identify malicious code in their projects’ dependencies.
Threat actors are abusing Argo Workflows to target Kubernetes deployments and deploy crypto-miners, according to a warning from security vendor Intezer.
The U.S. House of Representatives this week passed several cybersecurity bills, including ones related to critical infrastructure, industrial control systems (ICS), and grants for state and local governments.
The Dutch Data Protection Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens – AP) announced Thursday that it has imposed a fine of €750,000 on TikTok “for violating the privacy of young children”. More specifically, TikTok failed to provide a privacy statement in the Dutch language, making it difficult for young children to understand what would happen to their data.
Authorities in the Netherlands have arrested a 24-year-old believed to be a developer of phishing frameworks for a cybercrime ring named “Fraud Family.”
Cyber risk measurement and mitigation platform provider Safe Security this week announced that it has received a $33 million strategic investment led by BT Group.
The funds, Safe Security says, will be used to double the size of its engineering team, as well as to increase the company’s spending on research and development.
